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1. INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, two issues have risen to the top of the international
development agenda: (a) Food Security; and (b) Migration and Development. Each has its own international agency champions (the FAO
and the IOM), its own international gatherings (the Global Forum on
International Migration and the World Forum on Food Security), its
own national line ministries (Departments of Immigration and Home
Affairs and Departments of Agriculture and Food Security) and its own
voluminous body of research and scholarly publications. Some international organizations (such as the World Bank) deal with both issues but
in such separate silos that they might as well be in separate organizations.
There is, in other words, a massive institutional and substantive disconnect between these two development agendas. The reasons are hard to
understand since the connections between migration and food security
seem obvious. Indeed, one cannot be properly understood and addressed
independently of the other.
Global and regional discussions about the relationship between migration
and development cover a broad range of policy issues including remittance flows, the brain drain, the role of diasporas and return migration.1
Strikingly absent from these discussions is any systematic discussion of
the relationship between population migration and food security. There
are a number of possible reasons for this. First, discussions of the impact
of migration on development tend to be pitched at the global and national
scale and focus on economic growth and productive investment. Secondly,
when discussion turns to the household level, the debate focuses largely on
remittance flows and the use of remittances by the household. There is a
general consensus that the expenditure of remittances on basic livelihood
needs is somehow non-developmental in that it does not lead to investment and sustainable productive activity.2 Not only is this an extremely
narrow perspective, it also means that the food needs of households (and
their food security more generally) are rarely given much consideration
as development objectives and outcomes. Thirdly, while this debate does
seek to understand the drivers of migration, it seems to ignore food shortages and insecurity as a basic cause of migration and it certainly seems to
forget that migrants themselves have to eat in the towns and cities to which
they migrate. Finally, discussions of migration and development tend to
focus more on international than internal migration. Food security is
certainly affected by international migration (for example, households in
Zimbabwe rely heavily on remittances from around the world to purchase
food and other necessities). However, the relationship between migration
and food security is particularly important within national boundaries.
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If the global migration and development debate sidelines food security,
the current international food security agenda has a similar disregard for
migration. The primary focus of the agenda is food insecurity and undernutrition and how enhanced agricultural production by small farmers can
resolve these endemic problems.3 The influential Alliance for a Green
Revolution in Africa (AGRA), for example, was established “to achieve
a food secure and prosperous Africa through the promotion of rapid,
sustainable agricultural growth based on smallholder farmers.”4 In much
of the thinking about rural food insecurity, there is an implicit assumption that Africa’s rural areas are bounded territories whose main problem
is that households do not produce enough food for themselves.
By drawing boundaries around the “rural” in this way, there is a tendency
to ignore the reality that migration is a critical food security strategy for
rural households up and down the African continent. Any intervention
to try and improve the food security of rural populations therefore needs
to acknowledge that migration both deprives rural households of agricultural labour and provides them with the remittances to purchase agricultural inputs and foodstuffs. Rural households purchase a good deal of their
food with cash that they receive from absent household members who
are working in other parts of a country or in other countries altogether.
Rural food insecurity is therefore not simply about how much a household produces from the land; often it is more about the fact that remittances from migrants are too small or too irregular to allow households to
purchase sufficient, good quality food.
If migration is a neglected aspect of discussions about rural food insecurity, it is almost totally absent from considerations of the causes and
impact of food security amongst urban populations. Many poor urban
households in African cities are made up entirely or partially of migrants.
Rural to urban migration is rarely a one-way, one-time move, however.
Many urban dwellers speak of and feel attached to a rural home. Households in Africa are often spatially stretched between rural and urban
spaces and occupied by different members of the kin group at different
times. The reality on the ground, then, is that the distinction between
“the rural” and “the urban” is an “obsolete dichotomy” in Africa.5 As
Ellis and Harris maintain: “It is not very helpful to treat ‘rural areas’ as
undifferentiated territories that exhibit definitively distinct features from
‘urban areas.’”6 Households are not static self-contained rural or urban
units but fluid entities with permeable boundaries whose degree of food
security is constantly and profoundly shaped by the mobility of people in
a continent “on the move.”7 If we accept this general argument, it immediately becomes clear that it would be unwise to drive a wedge between
rural and urban food security as if they had very little relationship to or
MIGRATION, DEVELOPMENT AND URBAN FOOD SECURITY
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impact on one another. On the contrary, not only are they inter-related
but migration becomes an important key to unlocking this relationship.8
In summary, food security needs to be “mainstreamed” into the migration and development agenda and migration needs to be “mainstreamed”
into the food security agenda.9 Without such an effort, both agendas will
proceed in ignorance of the other to the detriment of both. The result
will be a singular failure to understand, and manage, the crucial reciprocal
relationship between migration and food security. This paper sets out to
promote a conversation between the food security and migration agendas
in the African context in the light of what we know and what we need to
know about their connections. Four main issues are singled out for attention: (a) the relationship between internal migration and urban food security; (b) the relationship between international migration and urban food
security; (d) the difference in food security between migrant and nonmigrant urban households; and (d) the role of rural-urban food transfers
in urban food security. Prior to addressing these issues, it is important to
disaggregate the complex phenomenon of migration not least because it
has been undergoing dramatic change in Africa.

2. INTERNAL MIGRATION AND
URBAN FOOD SECURITY
2.1 Urbanization and Circulation
Rapid urbanization is a distinguishing characteristic of contemporary
Africa and a great deal of this urban growth is fuelled by rural-urban
migration. The urban population of SADC increased from 20.5 million
in 1990 to an estimated 34 million in 2010 (Table 1).10 UN-HABITAT
predicts that it will increase further to 39 million in 2020 and 52 million
in 2030. At the present time, 59% of the population is urbanized, a figure
TABLE 1: Southern African Urban Population, 1950-2050
Population 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Urban
5,869 8,277 11,118 14,752 20,502 27,657 34,021 38,809 43,741 48,119 51,917
(000s)
Urban (%)
37.7
42.0
43.7
44.7
48.8
53.8
58.7
63.5
68.3
72.9
75.0
All Africa
14.4
18.6
23.6
27.9
32.1
35.9
39.9
44.6
49.9
55.7
61.6
(%)
Source: State of African Cities 2010
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projected to pass 70% in the next 20 years and to rise to over 75% by
mid-century (Figure 1).
FIGURE 1: Southern African Urban Population, 1950-2050
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In 1990, only South Africa was more than 50% urbanized. By 2050, all
of the region’s countries except Swaziland are projected to be over 50%
urbanized (Table 2). Urbanization rates will exceed 75% in Angola,
Botswana and South Africa. Evidence for rapid urbanization in Africa
should not be interpreted as a permanent one-time rural-to-urban shift
or that rural areas are undergoing an inevitable process of depopulation. Certainly the overall trend is towards more people living for longer
periods in towns and cities. But this does not mean that they are necessarily cutting all links to the countryside. Indeed, there is considerable
evidence that most first-generation migrants retain very close ties with
their rural homesteads. This adds considerable complexity to our understanding of migration dynamics and impacts.

MIGRATION, DEVELOPMENT AND URBAN FOOD SECURITY
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TABLE 2: Southern African Urbanisation, 1950-2050 (% Urbanised)
Country
1950 1960 1970 1980
Angola
7.6 10.4 15.0 24.3
Botswana
2.7
3.1
7.8 16.5
Lesotho
1.4
3.4
8.6 11.5
Mozambique 2.4
3.7
5.8 13.1
Namibia
13.4 17.9 22.3 25.1
South Africa 42.2 46.6 47.8 48.4
Swaziland
1.8
3.9
9.7 17.9
Zambia
11.5 18.2 30.4 39.8
Zimbabwe
10.6 12.6 17.4 22.4
Source: State of African Cities 2010

1990
37.1
41.9
14.0
21.1
27.7
52.0
22.9
39.4
29.0

2000
49.0
53.2
20.0
30.7
32.4
56.9
22.6
34.8
33.8

2010
58.5
61.1
26.9
38.4
38.0
61.7
21.4
35.7
38.3

2020
66.0
67.6
34.6
46.3
44.4
66.6
22.3
38.9
43.9

2030
71.6
72.7
42.4
53.7
51.5
71.3
26.2
44.7
50.7

2040
76.4
77.1
50.2
60.8
58.6
75.7
32.5
51.6
57.7

2050
80.5
81.7
58.1
67.4
65.3
79.6
39.5
53.4
64.4

South Africa has the highest proportion of urban dwellers of all SADC
countries (60-70%) and appears closest to the model of a classic “urban
transition.”11 A progressively greater proportion of the population lives
permanently in towns and cities, not least because the rural areas of the
country do not offer households the prospect of a decent livelihood or
many future prospects.12 The volume of internal migration in South Africa
grew rapidly after the collapse of apartheid-era influx controls.13 Cumulative migration (the number of people living in a province other than their
province of birth) was 5.5 million in 2001, or more than 10% of the total
South African-born population. Internal migration (whether of population in general or of temporary labour migrants) is therefore an extremely
significant phenomenon in South Africa. At the municipal level, most
internal migration is towards municipalities that are highly urbanized (the
so-called ‘metros’). The South African Cities Network calculated that the
seven largest urban municipalities in South Africa attracted over 500,000
additional migrants between 2001 and 2006.14 In five of those areas, these
migrants made up over 4% of the total population (Table 3).
TABLE 3: South African Municipalities Experiencing Greatest In-Migration, 2001-6
Name of Municipality

Province

Net In-Migration

Ekurhuleni
Gauteng
140,252
City of Tshwane
Gauteng
137,685
City of Cape Town
Western Cape
129,400
City of Johannesburg Gauteng
120,330
West Rand
Gauteng
42,674
eThekwini
KwaZulu-Natal
27,277
Nelson Mandela
Eastern Cape
6,715
Source: State of the Cities Report 2006, p. 2.18.

Total Pop. in 2006
2,384,020
1,926,214
2,952,385
2,993,716
732,759
2,978,811
1,073,114

Recent In-Migrants
as % of Total Pop.
5.9
7.1
4.4
4.0
5.8
0.9
0.6
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Simply because urbanization is proceeding rapidly, it does not mean that
individuals or households who move are cutting their links with rural
areas. How significant a phenomenon is circular migration in South Africa
and, if so, is it likely to continue?15 The answers to these questions have a
significant bearing on both rural and urban food security in the country.
Based on their work in rural and peri-urban communities in the eastern
part of the country, Collinson et al argue for the existence of “highly
prevalent circular migration” between rural and urban areas and note a
marked increase in temporary female migration.16 While there does seem
to be a trend towards greater permanent migration of households to urban
areas, temporary labour migration from rural households did grow after
the end of apartheid. The number of rural households with members who
were migrant workers actually increased in the 1990s and a significant
proportion of households are reliant on migrant remittances. In 1993, 33%
of all rural households reported at least one migrant member. By 2002,
this figure had increased to 38% (an increase of 300,000 households).17 In
the last decade, however, it appears that the number of households with
migrant workers may have begun to fall as migrants (and households)
settle more permanently in urban areas.18 The number of households with
an absent adult member, for example, dropped from 2.2 million in 1993
to 1.6 million in 2008 (a fall to 30% of all households).
Zambia represents a rather different model of the relationship between
internal migration and urbanization. The nature of urbanization in Zambia
has been a source of debate for years.19 Zambia’s urban population grew
from 3.2 million in 1990 to 3.6 million in 2000. However, the proportion
of the population living in urban areas actually fell from 39% to 35%,
prompting researchers to conclude that growing economic hardship and
urban poverty was leading to a process of “counter-urbanization.”20 As
Potts concludes, “while the fact of net out-migration from urban areas
during the 1990s has now been established as a component in the drop
in urbanisation levels, it is possible to now state that it was the primary
component”.21 Zambia’s post-2000 economic recovery and growth may
well have reversed the counter-urbanization trend of the 1990s. Certainly
this is the view of UN-HABITAT which estimates that urban growth
rates increased from 1.1% per annum between 1995 and 2000 to 2.3% per
annum between 2005 and 2010. Zambia’s Central Statistical Office notes
a recent increase in rural-rural and rural-urban migration and a decline
in urban-rural migration (Figure 2).22 However, there is every indication
that rural-urban linkages remain strong in Zambia and will remain that
way into the foreseeable future.

MIGRATION, DEVELOPMENT AND URBAN FOOD SECURITY
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FIGURE 2: Internal Migration in Zambia, 1996-2006
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Source: Ianchovichina and Lundstrom, Inclusive Growth in Zambia, p. 4.

Zimbabwe presents a third scenario in which political and economic crisis
have precipitated major shifts in internal population movement. During a
relatively prosperous first decade of independence after 1981, rural-urban
migration increased rapidly as people sought new economic opportunities
in the country’s towns and cities.23 Most new urbanites maintained close
contact with their rural roots and circular migration was fairly typical.24 In
the 1990s, the country’s Structural Economic Programme (SAP) slowed
both the post-independence economic boom and the pace of urbanization.25 Unemployment began to increase but the urban population still
increased by over 1 million between 1990 and 2000 (and from 29% to
34% of the total population). The crisis in the formal urban job market
and the serious decline in urban incomes led to net out-migration from
the main towns.26
Draconian government policies caused further livelihood destruction and
internal migration. The forcible expropriation of white-owned commercial farms led to massive displacement of black farmworkers to the towns.
That was followed by Operation Murambatsvina, “a lethal mixture of
vindictive electoral politics, a particularly strong attachment to planned
environments, and a wish to reduce the urban population for political
and economic reasons.”27 The nationwide assault on urban informality
destroyed the housing and livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of urban
households.28 However, it was not particularly successful in its aim of
forcing urban-dwellers to retreat permanently into the rural areas. The
major difference with Zambia in the 1990s was that many households,
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both rural and urban, turned to international migration as a survival
strategy.29
Deborah Potts has recently reviewed the empirical evidence on urbanization trends in Sub-Saharan Africa and argues that the idea that migration
is a permanent move to urban areas is misplaced.30 Drawing on a range of
empirical sources, and her own longitudinal tracking of migration trends
in Zimbabwe, she argues that “circulation” between rural and urban areas
is still a defining characteristic of African urbanization and internal migration:
Circular migration between rural and urban areas remains a crucial,
and adaptable, aspect of urbanization processes in sub-Saharan
Africa… The scale, duration and direction of such migration flows
have adapted in logical ways to the increasing poverty in urban
areas that accompanied structural adjustment, and net in-migration
has been reduced, sometimes very markedly. These adaptations are
mainly the result of very negative livelihood changes for most of the
urban population for whom there is no economic safety net, if all else
fails, except within the nexus of rural-urban linkages.31
Various household surveys by Potts and others suggest that the dynamics
of urbanization, circular migration and rural-urban linkage are complex
and highly variable. As Potts notes, “migrants in town include different
types of people with different histories, aspirations and social connections
with their place of origin.”32
Given the high rates of urbanisation in Southern Africa, migrants have
a visible presence in the region’s towns and cities. AFSUN’s urban food
security baseline survey in 2008-9 found that poor neighbourhoods in
most cities were dominated by migrants.33 Of the 6,453 urban households interviewed in 11 SADC cities, 38% were first-generation migrant
households (that is, every member of the household was born outside the
city). In contrast, only 13% of households had no migrant members. The
remainder (nearly half) comprised a mix of migrants and non-migrants,
usually households in which the adults were migrants and the children
were born in the city. The relative importance of migrants did vary from
city to city, however. All of the cities had a comparatively small proportion of non-migrant households (ranging from a low of 5% in the case
of Gaborone to a high of 20% in the case of Johannesburg). In other
words, in every city 80% or more of the households were composed
either entirely of migrants or had some migrant members. The biggest
difference was in the relative number of migrant households (from a high
of 67% in Gaborone to a low of 9% in Harare).

MIGRATION, DEVELOPMENT AND URBAN FOOD SECURITY
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At a general level these differences are attributable to each country’s distinctive history of urbanisation. The four ex-apartheid cities (Cape Town,
Johannesburg, Msunduzi and Windhoek) all have relatively high numbers
of pure migrant households, a pattern that is broadly consistent with mass
rural to urban household migration following the collapse of apartheid.
Cities in countries that have been independent for a longer period (such as
Malawi, Swaziland and Zambia) tend to have more mixed households and
fewer purely migrant households. In those countries, independence was
accompanied by rapid in-migration to primate cities and those urbanites
have been in the cities long enough to have second and even third generation members born in the city. Mozambique and Zimbabwe became
independent rather later and were also severely affected by pre-independence civil conflict and post-independence economic crisis. These two
cities have an extraordinarily high number of mixed households (nearly
80%). The obvious anomaly in the survey is Gaborone with two thirds of
its households consisting entirely of migrants. Gaborone has been urbanizing much faster than the either Manzini or Maseru (with which it is
often compared) (see Table 4), a reflection of the fact that Botswana’s
economy is much more vibrant that Lesotho or Swaziland’s, drawing
more migrant households from the countryside to the city.
TABLE 4: Proportion of Migrant and Non-Migrant Households
City

Gaborone
Cape Town
Msunduzi
Windhoek
Johannesburg
Maseru
Manzini
Lusaka
Blantyre
Maputo
Harare
Total

Migrant Households
(% of Total)
67
54
48
49
42
37
32
24
17
11
9
38

Mixed Households (%
of Total)
28
40
43
40
35
52
55
56
65
78
78
49

Non-Migrant
Households (% of
Total)
5
6
9
11
23
11
13
20
18
11
13
13

2.2 Food Security and Stretched Households
The rural focus of the international and national food security agenda is
already influencing the way in which the migration-food security nexus is
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understood. A recent issue of the journal Food Policy, for example, suggests
that “the sending of a migrant means the loss or reduced presence of one
or more members of the household. On the consumption side this clearly
means fewer mouths to feed and to support in other ways. On the production side, migration means the loss of labor and, in fact, the negative
consequences of migration on nutrition are likely to come through this
labor loss.”34 The major positive impact of migration is the remittances
sent home by the migrant which can have direct and indirect effects on
production and consumption.35 Implicit in this analysis is a prioritisation
of the impact of migration on the food security of the rural household.
This is an important issue, but so is the relationship between migration
and the food security of the urban household. A focus on migrant remittances will break the conventional notion of the rural household as wholly
or mainly dependent on smallholder production, but it does not take us
far enough in addressing the full range of impacts that migration has on
food security, including the food security of the permanent and temporary residents of the region’s towns and cities.
Rapid urbanization certainly effects massive change in the volume and
nature of what a growing city eats. However, conceptualizations of
migration and food security need to take account of the reality of “highly
mobile urban and rural populations, coupled with complex, fluid households.”36 The concept of the “stretched household” seems most relevant
to breaking down the artificial wall between the urban and the rural and
between rural and urban food security. First, it more closely approximates
a reality in which migrants “continue to be members of rural households
whilst forming or joining other households in an urban area.”37 Secondly,
it emphasizes the complex connections between the urban and the rural:
The notion of a “divide” (between the rural and the urban) has
become a misleading metaphor, one that oversimplifies and even
distorts realities… The linkages and interactions have become an ever
more intensive and important component of livelihoods and production systems in many areas – forming not so much a bridge over a
divide as a complex web of connections in a landscape where much is
neither “urban” nor “rural.”38
Thirdly, the concept highlights the fact that urban and rural food security
are often inter-dependent at the level of the individual household.
As urban-urban migration increases (for example, from smaller urban
centres to large cities) within countries and across borders, “stretched
households” are also emerging in the purely urban context. In Lesotho,
for example, many households in the capital city of Maseru have members
working in South African towns and cities. The National Migration
MIGRATION, DEVELOPMENT AND URBAN FOOD SECURITY
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Survey in Namibia found that urban-urban migration made up 20% of
lifetime migration moves.39 In South Africa, the “fluidity, porosity and
spatially ‘stretched’ nature of households” has been observed. Household
fluidity relates to the “contested nature” of household membership, the
claims of non-core urban household members on household resources
and the “spatially extended nature of the links and resource flows
thus created.”40 As a result, the density of exchanges between the two
(primarily of people, goods, cash and social grants) impacts on the food
security of stretched households:
These (migrant) exchanges, networks and resource flows play a key
role in alleviating the effects of poverty and managing vulnerability.
They help households and household members to take advantage of
opportunities and to diffuse risk across space. Ties to urban beneficiaries are a vital source of income for rural households in the context of
ever-present monetisation and when living even in the countryside
requires cash. For urban dwellers, the possibility of entitlements from
rural households serves as a vital livelihood ‘cushion’, particularly if
the rural kin have access to land or are able to care for children while
parents seek employment in urban centres.41
Increasingly, multi-nodal households are emerging, “stretched” between
two or more locations. In Maputo, poor urban households are stretched
to include the Mozambican countryside and urban areas in South Africa:
The urban poor in Maputo survive through a variety of strategies.
The use of kinship networks is a principal strategy, in which ‘nonmarket solidarities’ are activated in the face of the failure of the state.
The development of multiple household strategies, and the dispersal
of family members geographically is one such strategy. A network of
exchanges is developed between the households, with members in
town exchanging goods and services with households in the countryside. Members of the family may migrate to neighbouring countries such as South Africa in order to spread the risk and diversify the
sources of survival. Faced with the exigencies of survival there is a
tension between the need for family cohesion and the pull of dispersal.
The dissolution of traditional social bonds has been a cause of enormous insecurity and social vulnerability.42
Even in a small country like Lesotho, household members are dispersed by
migration yet maintain strong social and material links with one another:
The Basotho are integrated together in a fluid shifting ensemble
of people, where members of the same family may have a relative
managing sheep and goats in the upper Senqu Valley in Lesotho, while
his brother cultivates mountain wheat and keeps a home ready for the
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herdsman when he comes down for the winter. They have a sister who
has married in the lowlands, where she struggles to grow maize on an
exhausted piece of eroded land. Her husband is fortunate to work in
the South African mines, and comes home monthly. When he was
younger he brought cattle back home from the mines, but now as he
has grown older he prefers to bring money and food and household
goods. Most of his remittances are spent on food, clothing, education
and medical expenses. They have another brother who teaches school
in a peri-urban community near Mafeteng and two younger sisters:
one who works as a domestic in Durban, South Africa, and another
who works in a textile factory in Maseru. Both support themselves
but also send money home. The sister recently married a policeman in
the city of Bloemfontein, South Africa, and is waiting until he finds a
place for both of them so she can move there. An uncle in Bloemfontein who took permanent residence in South Africa when he retired
from the mines is helping them find a place to live. All of these folk
visit each other regularly, so that there is a constant flow from mountain to lowland to town to South African city and back.43
In other words, a “household” may well have migrant members living,
working and otherwise making do in more than one city in the country
or region. This adds yet another layer of complexity and fluidity to household food security strategies.

3. SOUTH-SOUTH MIGRATION
AND FOOD SECURITY
3.1 Changing Migration Streams
Prior to the 1990s, most international migration in the Southern African
region involved young, mostly male, labour migrants moving temporarily to another country to work in primary industry such as mining and
commercial agriculture. This form of “circular migration” began in the
late nineteenth century and became entrenched in the twentieth.44 The
system was closely regulated by governments and employers who ensured
that other family and household members remained behind in the country
of origin. Most migrants were warehoused in single-sex dormitories on
mines or farms where they were fed high-protein diets by employers.45
Migrants remitted most of their earnings to rural households who used
the funds to pay taxes and purchase basic necessities. Employers paid low
MIGRATION, DEVELOPMENT AND URBAN FOOD SECURITY
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wages on the assumption that the rural household would produce food
to feed itself. This practice became less tenable as the twentieth century
progressed and the sub-continent’s rural areas became more degraded and
incapable of supporting the population through agriculture. The inevitable result was that in many areas the food security of rural households
became increasingly dependent on migrant remittances.
Since 1990, Southern Africa’s longstanding regime of temporary crossborder migration has undergone major transformation.46 The reconfiguration of migration streams has considerable implications for urban and
rural food security and the migrants who shuttle between town and countryside. In order to understand the complex inter-relationships between
mobility and food security, it is therefore necessary to understand the
different types of migration that make up the contemporary migration
regime of a region ‘on the move.’ Firstly, since 1990, there has been a
dramatic increase in legal cross-border migration to and within Southern
Africa. Traffic between South Africa and the rest of Africa increased
from around 1 million in 1990 to nearly 10 million in 2008 (Figure 3).
Increased mobility has also been observed at numerous other borders
across the SADC region. There are now some migrants from each SADC
country in every other SADC country.
FIGURE 3: Legal Entries to South Africa from Rest of Africa, 1990-2010
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Zimbabwe has become the major migrant sending country in Southern
Africa in the last two decades. The vast majority of these migrants are
in South Africa with smaller numbers in other SADC countries and
in Europe and North America. The number of Zimbabweans crossing
legally into South Africa increased from under 200,000 per annum in
the late 1980s to 1.5 million in 2010 (Figure 4). In addition, there are
an unknown number of undocumented migrants who cross the border
through unofficial channels. Zimbabwean migrants maintain very close
ties with the country, remitting considerable sums of money and quantities of goods to household members still in the country. Most engage in
circular migration and return home frequently. In a 2006 survey, SAMP
found that 31% return to Zimbabwe at least once a month and 76% at
least once a year.47

FIGURE 4: Legal Entries from Zimbabwe to South Africa, 1980-2010
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Source: Statistics South Africa

Circular migration is also a defining characteristic of migrants who move
to South Africa from other countries in the SADC region. The numbers
of migrants from all the other countries in the region have grown consistently since 1994. Those from Malawi, Mozambique and Lesotho come
in the greatest numbers. As the Lesotho case demonstrates, this is not just
a case of growing numbers but involves complex reconfigurations in who
migrates, where and why.48 For decades, cross-border migration from
Lesotho to South Africa was primarily undertaken by young males who
MIGRATION, DEVELOPMENT AND URBAN FOOD SECURITY
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went to work on the South African gold mines. This decades-old pattern
began to break down in the 1980s and 1990s when the mining industry
closed mines and retrenched Basotho migrant workers in considerable
numbers. In response, more women began to migrate for work within
and outside the country. In South Africa, women tend to work in two
sectors known for their lack of regulation and labour rights: commercial
farms and domestic work.49 Within Lesotho, the growth of a domestic
textile industry in the country’s urban centres has led to a major upsurge
in the internal migration of young women (Figure 5).

FIGURE 5: Male Employment in South African Mines and Female
Employment in Lesotho Garment Factories, 1990-2006
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A household survey by SAMP in 2006 in Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland and Zimbabwe showed that minework in South Africa
still constitutes a significant component of the cross-border migration
flow (Table 5).50 The occupational profile of Zimbabwean migrants is
far more diverse than migrants from the other countries, with very few
mineworkers from that country:
The contemporary migration flow from Zimbabwe is extremely
“mixed” compared with pre-1990 out-migration and with that from
other countries in the Southern African region. There are almost as
many women migrants as men; there are migrants of all ages from
young children to the old and firm; those fleeing hunger and poverty
join those fleeing persecution and harassment; they are from all rungs
of the occupational and socioeconomic ladder; they are highly-read
and illiterate, professionals and paupers, doctors and ditch-diggers.51
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TABLE 5: Occupations of Labour Migrants in South Africa, 2006
Occupation
Botswana
%
Professional
Professional
1.6
worker
Health worker
0.6
Employer/
0.0
Manager
Teacher
0.0
Farmer
1.1
Businessman/
0.6
woman
White Collar
Office Manager
0.3
Office Worker
1.1
Blue Collar
Skilled manual
0.8
Foreman
0.6
Police/Military
0.2
Security
0.0
Mineworker
87.2
Farmworker
0.2
Service worker
1.1
Unskilled
Domestic
1.7
worker
Unskilled
0.5
manual
Informal Economy
Informal
0.2
producer
Trader/
0.0
hawker/vendor
Other
0.8
N
633
Source: SAMP Data Base

Lesotho
%

Country of Origin
Swaziland
%
%

Mozambique

Zimbabwe
%

Total
%

2.9

1.7

3.5

14.7

4.8

0.3
0.0

0.3
0.0

0.5
0.4

10.6
1.3

2.3
0.3

0.1
0.3
1.2

0.1
0.1
4.0

0.8
0.4
1.1

7.0
0.7
4.2

1.5
0.5
2.2

0.2
0.3

0.0
0.4

0.8
1.7

3.5
4.6

0.9
1.5

6.2
0.1
0.0
0.2
68.4
2.0
1.1

8.0
0.5
0.1
0.5
30.5
2.2
1.2

6.1
0.7
0.2
1.9
62.3
0.5
2.5

4.9
0.5
0.4
0.1
3.0
1.2
9.9

5.6
0.5
0.1
0.6
49.5
1.3
3.1

9.0

0.9

1.6

1.9

3.2

1.5

9.5

7.8

2.1

4.7

2.8

0.8

0.4

4.8

1.8

2.0

6.0

0.7

14.7

4.6

0.0
1,076

16.9
987

4.3
1,132

2.9
857

5.3
4,685

Minework is still important for Mozambicans but they, too, have an
increasingly diverse occupational profile. In general, however, the migrant
stream from all countries is dominated by blue collar, unskilled and
MIGRATION, DEVELOPMENT AND URBAN FOOD SECURITY
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informal economy migrants. These migrants come from households in
their home countries that are heavily dependent on migrant remittances
to meet basic needs and are likely to be more food insecure than their
better-resourced counterparts. A central question that therefore needs to
be addressed is whether migrant-sending households are more or less food
secure than households that do not send migrants. Another important
question is the food security experience of migrants themselves at their
place of destination. Since many work in low-wage sectors and jobs, and
the cost of living is much higher in cities, it is likely that they are also
vulnerable to food insecurity when away from home.
The number of labour migrants working without official work permits
and/or residency status within the countries of SADC is difficult to determine. Despite very high rates of domestic unemployment, most irregular
migrants do seem able to find jobs or income-generating opportunities.
A 2010 SAMP study of recent Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa,
for example, found that 21% were working in the informal economy,
10% were working part-time and 53% full-time. Only 14% were unemployed.52 In South Africa, employers in sectors such as commercial
agriculture, construction and domestic work actually prefer non-South
African workers (since they can subvert labour laws, avoid paying benefits
and violate minimum wage legislation).53 The primary policy response to
irregular migration is summary arrest and deportation.54 Since 1990, just
over 3 million migrants have been deported from South Africa (Figure 6).
The vast majority (97%) of deportees come from other SADC countries
(with Mozambique and Zimbabwe making up 90% of the total), leading
some to question the cost effectiveness of this strategy. Deportation in
such massive numbers is not generally viewed as a form of “migration”
yet it does involve (forced) movement and can have major impacts on the
livelihoods and food security of deportees and their households.
FIGURE 6: Deportations from South Africa, 1990-2008
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The SADC region has experienced several waves of mass “forced migration” in recent decades. Over 3 million refugees fled Mozambique in
the 1980s to refugee camps in Malawi, South Africa and in Zimbabwe.
In South Africa, many refugees eventually settled and were integrated
into local rural and urban communities. The war in Angola also led to
mass movements of refugees to neighbours Zambia and Namibia. More
recently, other “conflict hotspots” in Africa have produced an influx of
asylum seekers to the countries of Southern Africa. In South Africa, a
total of 150,000 asylum applications were received by the Department
of Home Affairs between 1994 and 2004 (Table 6). In the same period,
only 27,000 applicants were granted refugee status. In January 2011,
the UNHCR estimated that refugee status had been granted to around
53,000 applicants in the whole post-apartheid period. However, the
refugee determination process is so backlogged that asylum decisions tend
to be taken on the basis of the country of origin rather than the individual
circumstances of the claimant. As a result, asylum seekers from countries
like Somalia and DRC have found it easier to get refugee status than those
from other African countries, such as Zimbabwe.55
Since 2004, the number of applications for refugee status has dramatically
increased. This is partially because irregular migrants have starting using
the system to legitimize their status in South Africa and avoid deportation.
In 2009, for example, there were 220,028 new applications for refugee
status (Table 7). In that year, 45,538 applications were rejected and only
4,531 were accepted. Of these 75% were from three countries (the DRC,
Ethiopia and Somalia). The number of registered asylum seekers in the
country at that time was around 420,000. Zimbabwe is now the leading
country of refugee claimants in South Africa (149,000 or 68% of all applications in 2009) followed by Malawi (16,000 or 7%). In 2009, only 200
Zimbabweans were granted refugee status while 15,370 applications were
refused.
Refugees are permitted by South African law to work and earn income.56
The situation of asylum-seekers is much more precarious: “Asylum seekers
are not allowed to work and thus have no means to support themselves,
if they do need support they have to approach government structures.
Asylum seekers have no rights to food, work, health care or education.”57
In practice, asylum-seekers have to live and many therefore resort to the
informal economy or irregular employment in order to make ends meet
while they wait (sometimes interminably) for their claims to be adjudicated. Clearly, though, refugees and asylum seekers do not enjoy the same
rights, levels of well-being and possibilities of access to food security.

MIGRATION, DEVELOPMENT AND URBAN FOOD SECURITY
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TABLE 6: Refugee Applications in South Africa by Country of Origin,
1994-2004
Country
Africa

Asia

DRC*
Angola*
Somalia
Nigeria
Kenya
Zimbabwe*
Ethiopia
Tanzania*
Senegal
Burundi
Congo-Brazzaville
Malawi*
Rwanda
Ghana
Cameroon
Ivory Coast
Pakistan
India
Bangladesh
China
Bulgaria
Others

Total
* = SADC Countries
Source: Department of Home Affairs

Applications
Number
24 808
12 192
14 998
12 219
10 553
6 857
6 537
4 821
4 724
4 570
3 823
2 765
2 167
2 114
2 011
1 006
12 576
10 472
4 173
2 846
1 616
10 098
157 946

%
15.7
7.7
9.5
7.7
6.7
4.3
4.1
3.1
3.0
2.9
2.4
1.8
1.4
1.3
1.3
0.6
8.0
6.6
2.6
1.8
1.0
6.4
100

The treatment of migrants in destination countries is another important determinant of income generating opportunities and therefore of
individual and household food security. Until recently, anti-immigrant
hostility and xenophobia was largely seen as a Northern plague.58
However, it is becoming increasingly evident that this phenomenon is
also increasingly common in migrant-receiving countries in the South.59
South Africa is one of the most migrant-intolerant countries in the world
and xenophobic attitudes and actions are distressingly common.60 In May
2008, xenophobic violence swept the country’s poor urban communities, leaving over 60 people dead and over 100,000 displaced.61 Damage
to the property and businesses of migrants ran into the millions of rands.
The violence destroyed the livelihoods of many migrants (who were
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corralled in makeshift refugee camps) and led to a dramatic increase in
personal insecurity and hardship for migrant-sending households in other
countries. While this scale of violence has not been repeated, attacks on
foreign-owned businesses continue in many areas. The specific connections between xenophobia, disrupted livelihoods and food insecurity have
not yet been examined. However, in general, any analysis of the relationship between migration and food security needs to consider the impact
of poor and abusive treatment of migrants by citizens, officialdom and
employers.
TABLE 7: Refugee Applications and Decisions in South Africa, 2009
Zimbabwe
Malawi
Ethiopia
DRC
Bangladesh
India
Somalia
China
Congo
Pakistan
Nigeria
Mozambique
Tanzania
Niger
Uganda
Burundi
Zambia
Ghana
Cameroon
Kenya
Angola
Rwanda
Lesotho
Eritrea
Senegal
Algeria
Totals
Source: UNHCR

Applications
149,453
15,697
10,715
6,226
4,923
3,632
3,580
3,327
3,223
3,196
3,023
2,559
1,739
1,445
1,425
1,208
1,000
942
667
624
335
275
258
219
204
133
220,028
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Accepted
200
0
1,307
779
31
0
1,213
0
613
0
0
0
0
0
20
133
0
0
9
0
7
17
0
202
0
0
4,531

Refused
15,370
7,749
3,130
1,706
3,310
1,045
638
1,634
1,391
1,770
2,046
882
602
1,071
759
367
266
648
429
276
132
68
54
71
74
50
45,538
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3.2 Cross-Border Migration and Urban Food
Security
The simplest way to examine the relationship between cross-border
migration and food security is to ascertain (a) how international migrants
address their own food and nutrition needs in the destination country and
(b) what happens to the income that they earn while away from home.
The two questions are not unrelated for the amount of money available to
send home is to some degree contingent on the food-related expenditures
of the migrant in the destination country. This is not as simple as it sounds
because the food-related draw on income in the destination country
may extend well beyond the individual migrant’s own needs. Migrants
rarely live alone and their income may often have to support members of
“makeshift” households (not all of whose members can find work) as well
as second households. One of the recurrent complaints of the partners
of male migrants in Lesotho and Mozambique, for example, is that they
receive less money because the migrants support second families in South
Africa as well.62
The Southern African Migration Programme (SAMP) has conducted
major household surveys in several SADC countries and provides valuable information on food expenditures in migrant-sending households.63
Table 8 shows the sources of income for a regional sample of 4,276 households with international migrants. Cash remittances are the most important source of income in all countries with 74% of all migrant-sending
households receiving remittances (with as many as 95% in Lesotho and
83% in Zimbabwe). In-country wage employment is a source of income
for 40% of households followed by remittances in kind (37%). Remittances in-kind are particularly important in Zimbabwe and Mozambique.
At the other end of the spectrum, only 8% of households receive income
from the sale of agricultural produce and only 5% receive social grants
(mainly in Botswana).
Remittances and in-country employment are easily the most important
sources of household income (an average R400 per month for each).
However, as noted, far more households receive income from remittances
than in-country employment.
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TABLE 8: Income Sources of Migrant Households, 2006 (% of Households)
Wage work
Casual work
Remittances
– money
Remittances
– goods
Sale of farm
products
Formal
business
Informal
business
Pension/
disability
grant
Gifts
Other
Source: SAMP

Botswana

Lesotho

Mozambique

Swaziland

Zimbabwe

87
12
76

9
6
95

34
13
77

46
2
64

57
11
83

Total
40
8
74

53

20

65

17

68

37

5

2

21

9

3

8

5

1

4

3

4

4

9

5

23

14

17

12

19

0.5

3

2

3

5

2
1

1.5
0

3
3

3
1

2
0.5

3
1

The vast majority of households (93%) purchase food and groceries
with their income (Table 9). No other expenditure category comes close
although a significant minority of households pay for cooking fuel, transportation, clothing, utilities, education and medical expenses. A mere
15% spend income on agricultural inputs (mainly in Swaziland). The
proportion of households spending remittances on food was over 80%.
Average household expenditures on food were R288 per month which is
much greater than the amounts spent on other common categories such
as transportation, education and medical expenses. The average monthly
expenditure of remittances on food was R150 per month. In other words,
remittances provided over 50% of average household income spent on
food. Without remittances the amount being spent on food would drop
precipitously. Remittances are therefore a critical component of food
security for migrant-sending households. Unsurprisingly, 82% of households said that remittances were “very important” and another 18% that
they were “important” to meeting household food needs.

MIGRATION, DEVELOPMENT AND URBAN FOOD SECURITY

23

urban food security series no. 9

TABLE 9: Monthly Expenses of Migrant-Sending Households
Expenditure Item

Food and groceries
Housing
Utilities
Clothes
Medical expenses
Transportation
Education
Entertainment
Savings
Fuel
Farming
Building
Special events
Gifts
Other expenses
Source: SAMP

% of Households
Spending Cash
Income on Item
93
9
38
42
30
44
31
3
17
44
15
8
8
4
2

% of Households
Spending
Remittances on
Item
82
10
30
52
20
34
52
3
12
6
10
10
8
3
1

Average Monthly
Expense (R)

288
9
36
267
24
48
91
18
200
58
434
576
239
55
81

The study found that 28% of households spend more than 60% of their
income on food. This varied considerably from country to country
ranging from 13% in the case of Zimbabwe to 40% in the case of
Mozambique. Even with remittances, only 17% said that they had always
or almost always had enough food in the previous year. Again this varied
from country to country with only 2% of households in Zimbabwe saying
they always or almost always had enough food. Mozambique returned the
highest figure, but still only 24%.
Cash remittances are not the only way in which migration contributes to
household security as many migrants also send food back home as part of
their in-kind remittance “package.” Further proof of the importance of
migration to household food security and other basic needs is provided
in the types of goods that migrants send home. There was little evidence
of luxury goods being sent. Instead, clothing (received by 41% of households) and food (received by 29%) were the items most frequently brought
or sent. In the case of Mozambique, 60% of households received food and
in Zimbabwe, 45%.
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4. MIGRANTS AND FOOD
SECURITY
The next question addressed in this paper is whether migrants are more
food insecure than longer term residents of the poorer areas of Southern
African cities. The question is a difficult one to answer definitively for a
number of reasons. First, there is the point already made that the food
security of the urban and rural members of a household are inter-linked.
One of the main reasons for temporary migration to urban areas is to earn
income to remit to rural household members. A migrant in the city may
sacrifice their own food security in order to remit and ensure that rural
relatives have enough to eat. Secondly, in a region in which the majority
of the food consumed by urban households is purchased, the food security of the migrant is highly contingent on their ability to earn income in
the urban formal or informal economy. Thirdly, there may be significant
differences between internal and cross-border migrants in terms of access
to urban employment and other income-generating activity. All of these
issues require much further research before we can draw definitive conclusions. However, there is suggestive case study evidence for some cities.
Recent studies of food security and migration in Johannesburg and Windhoek provide an opportunity to compare the food security of internal and
international migrant households.64 The Johannesburg study interviewed
487 households, of whom 60% were internal migrants and the rest international migrants (mainly from Zimbabwe). Three quarters of the internal
migrants were living in an informal settlement (compared to only 11% of
cross-border migrants). Most of the cross-border migrants (86%) lived in
the inner-city often in multi-household flats. Just over half of the households sent money outside the city. Another 21% sent food. Cross-border
migrants in the inner-city were more likely to remit cash (60% versus
38% of households) and food (30% versus 6%) than internal migrants
in the informal settlement. In terms of food security, 49% said that their
food access had improved since moving to Johannesburg while only 19%
felt that it had deteriorated. However, cross-border migrants were more
likely to report an improvement than internal migrants. The latter were
also more likely to report that they had experienced food shortages in
the previous year (68% versus 56%). Dietary diversity was also poorer
amongst internal migrants. Clearly, migration may mean improved food
access but it does not guarantee that shortages will not be experienced.
Unreliable income was cited most often by both sets of migrants as the
reason for food shortages.
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The Windhoek study interviewed a total of 513 migrant heads of household living in formal and informal settlements. The majority (98%) were
internal migrants, mostly from the Northern regions of the country.
Money is remitted to rural areas by 54% of the respondents, and 90%
of the money is sent to rural areas in the North. Neither food nor goods
are sent in any quantity although most migrants said that the bulk of the
money they sent was spent on food. There was no evidence of any correlation between food insecurity and formal/informal residence. However,
there was a significant association between urban food security and
the region of origin. Migrants from the North of the country reported
decreased food security in Windhoek compared to home, while those
from South reported improved food security. This raises an important
general point about the relationship between migration and urban food
security i.e. that rural areas are far from uniform in their levels of food
insecurity. Migrants coming to the cities do not all share the same food
security baseline and this, in turn, impacts on their perceptions of food
security in the city.
The 2008 AFSUN urban food security baseline survey provides an
opportunity for a much broader regional comparison of migrant and nonmigrant households in the poorer neighbourhoods of cities. Given the
centrality of food purchase to urban food security, access to income is
a critical issue. The question, then, is whether established non-migrant
households are more or less likely to access regular and reliable sources of
income, both formal and informal. In general, the income source profile
for migrant and non-migrant households is not that dissimilar (Table 10).
Across the sample as a whole, unemployment rates are high with nearly
half of both migrant and non-migrant households receiving no income
from regular wage work. This suggests that migrants are no more or less
likely to obtain wage employment than permanent residents in the city, a
finding of some significance since it is often assumed that migrants have a
harder time finding work than those born and bred in a city.
Migrant households do seem to find it easier to derive income from casual
work (Table 10, Figure 7). A number of other small differences emerged.
First, non-migrant households were more involved than migrant households in running informal and formal businesses (20% versus 14%). This
suggests it may be easier for permanent residents of the city to access the
resources (such as credit) to run and grow a business. Secondly, although
very few households in either category earn any income from the sale of
home-grown agricultural produce, non-migrant households did seem a
little more likely to engage in urban agriculture, presumably because they
have readier access to land through home ownership. Thirdly, migrant
households were slightly more likely than non-migrant households to be
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receiving social grant income (19% versus 16%). The difference is not
large but it suggests that migrant households eligible to receive social
grants are able to access them even if they are not in their home area.

TABLE 10: Sources of Household Income
Migrant Households (%)
Wage Work
Casual Work
Remittances
Urban Agriculture Products
Formal Business
Informal Business
Rent
Social Grants
N

51.2
24.2
8.0
1.0
3.5
10.5
4.0
19.3
2,425

Non-Migrant Households
(%)
54.4
20.1
8.4
3.2
4.1
15.9
5.5
15.6
801

FIGURE 7: Sources of Household Income
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The similarities in the access of migrant and non-migrant households to
the labour market and to various income-generating activities suggests
that they might have similar income levels and, in turn, levels of food
security. In fact, there was one distinct difference in the income profile
of migrant and non-migrant households (Figure 8). About a third of the
households in each group fell into the lowest income tercile. However,
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36% of non-migrant households were in the upper income tercile,
compared to only 29% of migrant households. The situation was reversed
with the middle income tercile. In other words, migrant status is not a
completely reliable predictor of whether a household will be income poor.
However, non-migrant households are likely to have a better chance of
having better incomes, primarily because some are able to access betterpaying jobs.
FIGURE 8: Income Terciles
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Since urban households purchase the bulk of their food, non-migrant
households might have a better chance of being food secure than migrant
households. The Household Food Insecurity Scale (HFIAS) measures
access to food on a 0 (most secure) to 27 (most insecure) point scale. The
mean and median score for all households in the survey was 10, suggesting
widespread food insecurity. Individual city means varied from a low of 5
in Johannesburg to a high of 15 in Harare.65 In terms of the relationship
between the HFIAS and food security, migrant households had a mean
score of 10.5 and a median of 10. Non-migrant households had lower
scores of 8.9 and 8 respectively. Although the differences are not massive,
the results confirm that non-migrant households have a better chance of
being food secure than migrant households.
This finding is given added weight by the Household Food Insecurity
Access Prevalence (HFIAP) Indicator. Only 16% of migrant households
can be categorized as “food secure” using the HFIAP Indicator, compared
with 26% of non-migrant households (Figure 9). At the opposite end
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of the scale, 61% of migrant households were severely food insecure,
compared with only 48% of non-migrant households. Or again, 78%
of migrant households are either moderately or severely food insecure,
compared with 65% of non-migrant households. Although levels of food
insecurity are disturbingly high for both types of household, migrant
households stand a greater chance of being food insecure.

FIGURE 9: Food Security of Migrant and Non-Migrant Households
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Another dimension of food insecurity is dietary diversity. The Household Dietary Diversity Scale (HDDS) measures how many food groups
have been eaten by household members in the previous 24 hours (up to a
maximum of 12). Most poor migrant and non-migrant households do not
have a particularly diverse diet. For example, nearly half of both groups
consumed food from 5 or fewer food groups, and nearly a quarter from 3
or fewer food groups. The main difference between the two groups comes
at the other end of the scale where diverse diets are more frequent among
non-migrant than migrant households. For example, 28% of migrant
households consumed food from 7 or more food groups, compared with
38% of all non-migrant households. In other words, non-migrant households are generally likely to have a more diverse diet.
Another question is whether there are any differences between migrant
and non-migrant households in where they obtain their food in the city.
Here some interesting differences emerged. Migrant households were
more likely than non-migrant households to patronise supermarkets.
The opposite was true with regard to the informal food economy. The
reason for this difference is not immediately apparent but may have to do
with the fact that non-migrant households would be more familiar with
alternative food sources compared with recent in-migrants, in particular,
who would be more likely to know about and recognise supermarket
outlets. A second difference is the extent to which households rely on
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other households for food, either through sharing meals or food transfers.
This was more common among migrant than non-migrant households,
suggesting the existence of stronger social networks amongst migrants.
Thirdly, and unsurprisingly given their greater degree of access to land
for gardens, non-migrant households were more likely to grown some of
their own food than migrant households.

TABLE 11: Household Dietary Diversity
No. of Food
Groups
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

Migrant Households (cum %)

Non-Migrant Households (cum %)

3
14
24
34
47
59
71
83
91
95
97
100

4
14
23
33
45
56
66
78
86
91
95
100

FIGURE 10: Sources of Food for Migrant and Non-Migrant Households
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5. MIGRATION AND FOOD
TRANSFERS
The rural and urban nodes in stretched households are linked by flows of
people, cash, goods and information. There is evidence that urban households in Africa rely to varying degrees on an informal, non-marketed
supply of food from their rural (and urban) relatives in order to survive
within hostile urban environments.66 In one documented case, Windhoek, the contribution turned out to be extremely significant.67 Frayne’s
study of 305 poor urban households found that poverty was widespread
and accompanied by high rates of unemployment. In addition, casual
work was not commonly available for low-income residents. The informal
sector was much more limited than in other cities in the region and urban
agriculture was scant and provided little contribution to household food
security. Only 5% of the sample were involved in some form of urban
agriculture. Yet there was no widespread starvation and little malnutrition. Only 9% of households said that hunger was always or almost always
a problem.
The primary asset that ameliorated the food insecurity of urban households proved to be urban-rural social networks. The resources required
to satisfy food and other needs come predominantly from the rural areas
direct to the urban household. The most vulnerable households were
those that had poor rural connections. However, 98% of the households
had relatives in the rural areas. Two-thirds of the households received
food from relatives and friends in the year prior to the survey. Nearly 60%
received food 2-6 times a year. Another study of Windhoek in 2008 found
that 44% of households interviewed in the poorer parts of the city received
food from outside the city and that 99% of this food was sent by family
members. Furthermore, 73% of this food was sent from the Northern
regions. The food received by the urban household included millet, wild
foods (especially spinach), meat, poultry and fish. The vast majority of
households (90%) consumed the food themselves with only 6% selling
it and 4% giving it away to other relatives and friends. In Windhoek,
therefore, urban food security for economically marginal households was
dependent “to a large degree” on the transfer of food from rural relatives:
The flow of goods between the urban and rural areas is truly reciprocal. With about two thirds of urban households both sending
money to the rural areas and receiving food from rural households,
the rural-urban symbiosis is well-established. Unless there is rapid
economic growth with jobs for unskilled and semi-skilled workers in
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Windhoek, the flow of food into the urban areas is likely to continue
as urban households continue to diversify their sources of food and
income.68
In the case of Maputo, the urban poor maintain “a close and conscious
relationship” with their rural area of origin:
They argue that it is important to maintain relationships with relatives and others in the village, and that being involved in agriculture
is important as “we do not have to spend so much money on food.”
Having machambas in the village is considered the best option as this
attaches people to their extended family, but many also have small
plots on the outskirts of Maputo or in the bairro itself.69
In Harare, too, migrants to the city maintain strong social and material
connections with the rural areas. In the past, the established practice was
for urban households to send money and supplementary food to the rural
areas. However, economic hardships in the city are now making it difficult for these flows to continue.70 Many urban households maintain small
plots of land in the village where they grow crops or keep animals. The
importance of these activities has grown with the food crisis in the cities.
By engaging in rural farming, urban household members contribute to
generating the food that they eat when they visit the countryside or sell to
get a supplementary income that they can use in both the rural and urban
area. A 2008 survey in Harare found that 35% of respondents normally
visit the rural areas to engage in farming activity.71 As many as 64% of
household respondents also reported that they normally visit their rural
homes to collect food and/or money. The economic crisis in that country
has, however, reconfigured the nature of these relationships and flows.
Urban households are increasingly getting more from the village than
they send, suggesting that the flow of resources between the rural and the
urban area has reversed. The net urban-ward flow of resources, and especially food, is partly responsible for the resilience of poor households in
the city. More than half of the households surveyed (61%) received food
from the rural areas. The most common foods transferred from the rural
areas included cereals (54% of households), root and tubers (36%), meat
and poultry (26%) and food made from beans and nuts (16%) (Figure 11).
The high cost of transport between the rural and the urban areas meant
that the majority of food transfers were only taking place 3-6 times a year
or even less frequently. Another crisis-related response involved members
of the urban household migrating back to the rural areas of Zimbabwe.

31

32

African Food Security Urban Network (Afsun)

FIGURE 11: Type and Frequency of Rural-Urban Food Transfers to Harare
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The prevalence of rural-urban food linkages in other parts of the Southern
African region needs more systematic investigation.72 With this in mind,
the 2008-9 AFSUN baseline survey included a number of questions
about food transfers in the 11 cities in which the survey was conducted.73
Almost one in three of the poor urban households surveyed by AFSUN
said they receive food from relatives or friends outside the city. The food
flows from relatives make up over 90% of the total. The study confirmed
the significance of food transfers in Windhoek with 47% of households
receiving food from outside the city. Transfers were also very significant
in Lusaka (44%), Harare (42%), Maseru (37%), Blantyre (36%) and
Manzini (35%) (Figure 12). By contrast, and not unexpectedly given the
impoverished state of South Africa’s communal land areas, the proportion of urban households receiving food transfers was much lower in the
three South African cities surveyed. While food transfers from rural areas
were certainly significant (41% of all households receiving transfers),
the survey made the important finding that even more transfers (48%)
occurred between households in different urban areas. The remainder
received food from both rural and other urban areas. Once again, clear
differences emerged between different cities. Households in Windhoek
and Gaborone were at one end of the spectrum, with around 70% of
transfers emanating from rural areas.
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FIGURE 12: Total Food Transfers to Urban Households (% of Households)
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The relative importance of rural-urban versus urban-urban food transfers
varied considerably from city to city. Rural transfers to households in
Windhoek made up 72% of total transfers while urban-urban transfers
made up only 12%. At the other end of the spectrum were the South
African cities. Cape Town, for example, had figures of 14% for ruralurban and 83% for urban-urban transfers. Some 82% of transfers to
Msunduzi and 62% of transfers to Johannesburg were also from other
urban areas outside these cities. The South African pattern reflects several
things. First, South Africa is the most urbanized of the nine countries in
the study. Secondly, South Africa’s rural areas are so impoverished that
they do not produce excess food that can be sent to support migrants
in the city. And thirdly, social networks and ties between relatives in
different cities are strong.
The figures for the cities in major migrant-sending countries are also
significant. In Maputo, for example, 62% of transfers are urban-urban.
High rates of urban-urban food transfer can also be found in Blantyre
(51%), Maseru (44%), Lusaka (44%) and Harare (43%). In each case, it is
likely that a large proportion of transfers come in the form of food remittances where migrants working in one city (often in another country)
send food to their relatives living in another urban area (often in their
home country).
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TABLE 12: Food Transfers by City (% of Households)
RuralUrban
Transfers
UrbanUrban
Transfers
Urban
and Rural
Transfers

Windhoek

Gaborone

Manzini Maseru

Lusaka

Blantyre

Harare

Joburg

Maputo

Msunduzi

Cape
Town

72

70

53

49

39

38

37

24

23

15

14

12

16

40

44

44

51

43

67

62

82

83

16

14

7

7

17

12

20

9

15

3

3

The type of transfer, whether rural or urban, was related to the frequency
with which urban households receive food. Households receive food
transfers far more often when the food comes from an urban area. Around
a quarter of households who had received food from other urban areas
did so at least once a week (compared to only 5% of households who
received rural-urban transfers). Some 76% of households received urbanurban transfers at least once every 2 months, compared to only 40%
of households receiving rural-urban transfers (Figure 13). This might
suggest that urban-urban networks and support mechanisms are stronger
than rural-urban ties. Alternatively, transportation is undoubtedly easier
between urban areas and urban-urban transfers are also much less likely to
be affected by the seasonal agricultural cycle.
FIGURE 13: Frequency of Food Transfers to Urban Households by Area of
Origin (% of Households)
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Transfers from rural and other urban areas are both dominated by cereals.
All urban households in the study cities received cereals at some point
during the year, irrespective of the source. However, there was a marked
difference in the frequency of transfers with a quarter of urban-sourced
cereals arriving at least once a week and 80% arriving at least once every
couple of months or more frequently (Table 13). In contrast, cereals from
rural areas came far less frequently, a clear reflection of the rural agricultural cycle. Those receiving cereals from other urban areas are not dependent on the cycle since the cereals can be purchased and sent at any time
of the year.
TABLE 13: Frequency of Transfers by Area of Origin (% of Households in
Previous 12 Months)
Food Type
Cereals

Total

Frequency
At least once a week
At least once every 2 months
3-6 times a year
At least once a year

Urban (%)
27
52
12
9
100

Rural (%)
2
25
36
37
100

Other differences between rural and urban transfers also emerged. Households receiving urban transfers were more likely to receive almost all types
of foodstuffs (with the exception of foods made from beans, peas, lentils
or nuts). For example, 51% of households receiving urban-urban transfers
received vegetables compared with 35% of those receiving rural-urban
transfers. Or again, 39% of urban-urban transfer households received meat
or poultry compared with only 23% of rural-urban transfer households.
The differences were particularly marked when it comes to processed
foods such as sugar/honey (40% versus 5%) and foods made with oil, fat or
butter (33% versus 6%).
Food transfers are particularly important for food-insecure urban households. Of the 1,809 households receiving food transfers from outside the
city, 84% were food insecure and 16% were food secure. The relative
importance of food transfers for food insecure households holds whether
the food is received from rural areas or other urban areas. There were,
however, variations between cities. In Gaborone, for example, households
were more likely to be food-secure if they receive food from rural sources
(33%), compared to either urban only (7%) or combined urban and rural
sources (8%). In Maputo, on the other hand, only 1% of food-secure
households received food from rural areas only, with 17% of food-secure
households getting food from urban areas only (mostly from migrants
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in South African cities) and the rest from both sources. Around 80% of
households receiving food transfers said that they were important or very
important to the household while 9% said they were critical to household
survival.74 Almost the same number (77%) said that the food was sent to
help the urban household feed itself. Only 20% said the food was sent as
a gift. The centrality of food transfers to urban food consumption was
illustrated by the fact that only 3% of households receiving food sold it for
cash income. The rest consumed the food themselves.75

TABLE 14: Types of Food Transferred

Cereals/grain
Roots/tubers
Vegetables
Fruit
Meat/poultry
Eggs
Food from beans, peas, lentils, nuts
Cheese/milk products
Foods made with oil, fat, butter
Sugar/honey
N

Rural-Urban % of
Receiving Households
100
21
37
9
23
4
40
10
6
5
753

Urban-Urban % of
Receiving Households
100
35
51
19
39
14
30
18
33
40
890

As noted above, food transfers from households outside the city to households within it are a notable feature in a number of SADC cities. The
final question which the AFSUN data sheds light on is whether migrant
households are more or less likely to receive transfers than non-migrant
households. Frayne has argued that migrants in the city receive such
transfers to keep them going while they search for work or other sources
of income. This suggests that migrant households, with their stronger
rural ties, would be more likely to receive food from rural households.
And so it proved although the difference was not that large. A total of
15% of migrant households received food transfers from rural relatives,
compared with only 10% of non-migrant households. Some non-migrant
households clearly maintain links with rural areas of sufficient strength to
facilitate food transfers. On the other hand, non-migrant households were
more likely than migrant households to received food transfers from other
urban areas (14% versus 10%). In addition, 61% of those non-migrant
households receiving food transfers got them from relatives in other urban
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areas (compared with only 28% who got them from rural areas). Migrant
households were also more likely to receive urban than rural transfers
although the difference was not as great (46% versus 43% of the total).

TABLE 15: Types of Transfer as Household Migrant-Status
Migrant Households (%)
Rural-Urban Food Transfers
Urban-Urban Food Transfers
Rural and Urban Transfers

43
46
11

Non-Migrant Households
(%)
28
61
11

6. CONCLUSION
Migration within and to the Southern African region has changed
dramatically in recent decades. All of the evidence suggests that the
region is undergoing a rapid urban transition through internal migration
and natural population increase. There has also been significant growth
in temporary cross-border movement within the region. The implications of the region’s new mobility regime for food security in general
(and urban food security in particular) need much further exploration
and analysis. To what degree is heightened mobility related to problems
of food insecurity? Food security shocks and chronic food insecurity can
certainly be major motives for migration for income-generating opportunities. War and conflict, particularly in Angola and the DRC, led to
the displacement of millions who fled to neighbouring countries. The
collapse of the Zimbabwean economy since 2000 has pushed hundreds
of thousands of desperate food-insecure people out of the country. The
meltdown has affected the poor but has also ravaged the urban middleclass leaving migration as the main “exit option.” Chronic poverty and
related food insecurity is also partially responsible for the upsurge in post1990 migration from countries such as Lesotho, Mozambique, Malawi
and Swaziland.
Current conceptualisations of the food security crisis in Africa provide
an inadequate basis for working at the interface between migration and
food security. First, there is the pervasive assumption that food security is
primarily a rural problem that will be resolved through technical innovation amongst smallholders (in the guise of a new Green Revolution). What
seems to be forgotten in this essentially romantic view of the African rural
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household is that its food security is not simply, or even mainly, a function
of what it does or does not grow for itself. Up and down the continent
rural households purchase some or most of their food and they do so with
cash that they receive from household members who have migrated to
earn income in other places within the country and across borders. The
evidence for Southern Africa, at least, is that these rural households do not
invest remittances in agriculture but in basic necessities, including food
purchase.76 Rural food security, in other words, may be improved but
will not be resolved by current productionist approaches to food security.
A second flawed assumption is that food security in urban areas is about
promoting urban agriculture. Urban agriculture can certainly contribute
to the food security of some households but it is very far from being a
panacea for all.77 The obsession with urban agriculture may be wellintentioned but it derives from the misplaced idea that increased food
production is the key to urban food security. The primary determinant
of food insecurity in African cities is not production shortfalls but the
lack of access to food and that means the absence of a regular and reliable
income with which to purchase it. Even within the poorest areas of the
city, access varies considerably from household to household with wage
employment, other income-generating activity, the size and structure of
the household, the educational level of the household members, access
to social grants and being embedded in social networks. This paper has
also demonstrated that the migrant status of a household is a key determinant of food security. The differences between migrant and non-migrant
households are relatively significant. While there are many poor and food
insecure households in both camps, there are more food secure households in the non-migrant group.
A third problematic assumption is that the rural and urban are separate
spheres with a deep divide between them. This dualistic view of the world
is clearly at odds with the observable web of connections and flows that
bind rural and urban spaces together. The concept of the stretched or
multi-nodal household attempts to capture the reality that even at the
micro-scale, there is regular circulation of people, goods and money
between town and countryside. Conceptually and methodologically,
this reality means that it is impossible to fully explain the state of food
security of urban households without reference to their rural counterparts, and vice-versa. For example, one of the reasons why there are fewer
food secure migrant households in the cities may be because, unlike
non-migrant households, they remit a portion of their income to rural
areas which are in even greater need of the cash. On the other hand, the
situation of migrant households would be even more desperate but for
relatively widespread intra-household rural-urban transfers of food.
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The fourth assumption is that migration and mobility are of limited relevance to food security. There are some recent signs of recognition of the
reality that migration and remittances play an important role in the food
security strategies of rural households. What tends to be overlooked is the
role of migration in the food security of urban households. As this paper
shows, the majority of households in poor areas in Southern African cities
either consist entirely of migrants or a mix of migrants and non-migrants.
Rapid urbanization, increased circulation and growing cross-border
migration have all meant that the number of migrants and migrant households in the city has grown exponentially. This is likely to continue for
several more decades as urbanization continues. We cannot simply assume
that all poor urban households are alike. While levels of food insecurity
are unacceptably high amongst all of them, migrant households do have a
greater chance of being food insecure with all of its attendant health and
nutritional problems. This fact needs to be recognised by policy-makers
and acted upon.
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MIGRATION,
DEVELOPMENT
AND URBAN
FOOD SECURITY
Over the last decade, two issues have risen to the top of the international
development agenda: Food Security & Migration and Development. Each has
its own agency champions, international gatherings, national line ministries
and voluminous bodies of research. There is thus a massive institutional and
substantive disconnect between these two development agendas. The reasons
are hard to understand since the connections between migration and food
security seem so obvious. Food security needs to be “mainstreamed” into the
migration and development agenda and migration needs to be “mainstreamed”
into the food security agenda. Without this happening, both agendas will
proceed in ignorance of the other to the detriment of both. The result will be a
singular failure to understand, and manage, the crucial reciprocal relationship
between migration and food security. This paper aims to promote a conversation
between food security and migration experts and policy-makers with particular
reference to the crisis of urban food security in Africa. The empirical basis of
the conversation is an AFSUN survey in 2008 and its findings on the differences
between migrant and non-migrant households in 11 cities in Southern Africa.
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